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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports some experiments on probabilistic reasoning designed to 
investigate the impact of the probabilistic problem presentation format (verbal-
numerical and graphical-pictorial) on subjects’ confidence in the correctness of their 
performance, other than the calibration between confidence and accuracy. To 
understand the potential effect of the format, these dimensions were assessed by 
monitoring contextual and individual variables: time pressure, numerical and 
visuospatial abilities, statistical anxiety and attitudes towards statistics. The participants 
included 257 Psychology students without statistical knowledge, recruited from Italian 
and Spanish universities, who fulfilled self-report validated measures. The students 
expressed their retrospective judgments of confidence item-by-item in relation to each 
probabilistic problem. This approach enabled the computation of two measures of 
calibration (the Bias Index - the Confidence-Judgment Accuracy Quotient). The results 
indicated that the problem presentation format did not exert a significant main effect 
on confidence, with the exception of when the interaction between the format and one 
subscale of the attitudes towards the statistics test was considered. The Bias Index, 
however, was significantly related to the interaction between format and time pressure. 
The study offers a point of reflection in relation to the potential effect exerted by the 
problem format and time constraint in calibration. 
Keywords: probabilistic reasoning, problem format, reasoning confidence, 
performance accuracy, metacognitive calibration, time pressure 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Performance in Probabilistic Reasoning 
Probabilistic reasoning is recognized as an essential tool in daily life and the educational lifetime. It is applied by 
individuals to address uncertainty, collect and analyse information, and understand data (Frosch & Johnson-Laird, 
2011). The substantial troubles encountered by students in the solution of these types of problems have been 
highlighted by many researchers (Brase & Hill, 2015). These difficulties are strong in undergraduates pursuing 
humanistic studies (e.g., Psychology), who often exhibit negative attitudes towards scientific disciplines, such as 
statistics and mathematics (Guàrdia-Olmos et al., 2006), evidencing low abilities in these topics, as well as high 
levels of statistical anxiety (Chiesi, Primi, & Carmona, 2011). The presence of these troubles has been induced to 
explore the cognitive processes that underlie probabilistic reasoning in individuals without statistical knowledge 
(Ayal & Beyth-Marom, 2014). 
The study of probabilistic problem solving is considered useful to inquire into the relationships between 
cognitive processes and individual differences, specifically referring to attitudes, abilities and task features. 
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Particularly, some scholars have underlined the relationships between individual differences and performance in 
problems that involved inductive, deductive, heuristic and methodological reasoning (Jackson, Kleitman, Howie, 
& Stankov, 2016; Stanovich & West, 2000). 
Hafenbrädl and Hoffrage (2015) analysed multiple aspects of problems that affect the application of 
probabilistic and Bayesian reasoning, promoting an ecological approach to the study of this type of reasoning. 
Exploratory analyses highlighted as both qualitative and quantitative dimensions may affect the Bayesian 
reasoning and the choice of the solution strategy (Hafenbrädl & Hoffrage, 2015). 
Within this context, many investigations have concerned the role of different aspects in the enhancement vs 
detriment of probabilistic reasoning. Among these studies, the most important ones have included the so-called 
effect of “graphical facilitation”; the latter expression indicates that the use of graphical representations may 
improve performance in probabilistic problem solving (e.g., Brase & Hill, 2015; Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2014; 
Moro, Bodanza, & Freidin, 2011). However, in the literature, the arguments that may support the occurrence of this 
effect are controversial. Several scholars have highlighted that the use of strategies could affect the cognitive 
processes implied in probabilistic reasoning (Gutierrez & Schraw, 2015; Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002). Among these 
strategies, Gutierrez and Schraw (2015) included the presentation of diagrams, graphs, pictures and tables, which 
may increase the accuracy, thereby fostering the calibration between accuracy and confidence in problem-solving 
and learning processes. 
Some authors in the literature (Okan, Garcia-Retamero, Cokely, & Maldonado, 2015) have pointed out that there 
is a relationship among numerical and visuospatial abilities, metacognitive processes and meaningful reasoning 
about probabilities. These relationships were observed in patients assessing health-relevant numeric data, both in 
groups with high and low education levels (Garcia-Retamero et al., 2015; Ghazal, Cokely, & Garcia-Retamero, 2014). 
In a review by Garcia-Retamero and Cokely (2017), psychological and cognitive mechanisms acting in the use of 
visual aids in this field have been highlighted. These authors observed that graphical representations might 
enhance judgment and the process of decision-making; indeed, the visual displays seemed to improve the ability 
of self-assessment and, as well, moderate overconfidence. These effects on metacognitive and behavioural function 
seem related to a better distribution of attention, which may increase, to a significant level, the comprehension of 
numerical data. These authors depict a conceptual framework in which graphical representations might serve as 
“moderators” of the effect of individual differences in numerical and graphical abilities, as may affect final decision-
making and behaviour. Additionally, within this framework, there are the mediating effects of cognitive and 
metacognitive functioning (i.e., accuracy in the uncertainty understanding, trust in information and, finally, 
behavioural dimensions). Furthermore, graphical representations appear to improve the user’s trust in his/her 
abilities (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2017), promoting a significant relationship among skills, encoding, self-
regulation, metacognition, final uncertainty evaluation and decision-making (Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Ghazal et al., 
2014). In order to foster the comprehension of probabilistic data, the graphical representations have to be 
“transparent” (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2017); this means they must be simple, clear, explicitly chosen relative 
to the aim of the communication and responsive to the user’s expertise and needs.  
In agreement with these considerations, we designed this study to investigate the specific role of metacognition 
that supports the probabilistic reasoning performance. In particular, the focus of our interest is on the confidence 
Contribution of this paper to the literature 
• This manuscript involves multiple studies; it describes experiments on probabilistic reasoning designed to 
investigate the impact of the probabilistic problem presentation format (verbal-numerical and graphical-
pictorial) on subjects’ confidence in the correctness of their performance, as well as on the calibration 
between confidence and accuracy. To understand the potential effects of the format, these dimensions were 
assessed by monitoring contextual and individual variables: time pressure, numerical and visuospatial 
abilities, statistical anxiety and attitudes towards statistics. This approach furnishes information in relation 
to the effects of graphical facilitation, which have not been exhaustively defined in the literature. 
• An innovative aspect of this work is the evaluation of these relationships in undergraduates in humanities 
and social sciences, who had not previously studied statistics, in which the effect of graphical facilitation 
versus graphical impediment could assume specific features. The students expressed their retrospective 
judgments of confidence item-by-item in relation to each probabilistic problem. This approach enabled the 
computation of two measures of metacognitive calibration (absolute calibration - the Bias Index, relative 
calibration - the Confidence-Judgment Accuracy Quotient). 
• This investigation stimulates the cross-country comparison between Italian and Spanish undergraduates; 
they belong to countries in the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) and are characterized by both 
common and differential aspects. We investigated whether the cultural aspects affect the performances and 
calibration in probabilistic reasoning. 
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and the previously described calibration in problems presented in different formats (i.e., verbal-numerical and 
graphical pictorial formats). In the present research, these aspects have been investigated by monitoring the effects 
exerted by a specific contextual characteristic (the presence vs absence of time pressure), as well as several cognitive 
and non-cognitive dimensions (i.e., numerical and visuospatial abilities, statistical anxiety and attitudes). 
Metacognition and Confidence in the Correctness of Performance: Their Relationships 
with Individual and Contextual Dimensions 
The confidence in the accuracy of a response has been recognized as a relevant and strong predictor of both 
achievement (Stankov, 2013; Stankov, Lee, Luo, & Hogan, 2012; Tempelaar, 2009) and probabilistic reasoning (Agus 
et al., 2015b). 
In the literature, it is often indicated that in the probabilistic reasoning, metacognition has a relevant role, which 
refers to the knowledge of both cognitive processes and cognitive activities (Lin & Zabrucky, 1998). Discussing this 
construct, Lin and Zabrucky (1998, p. 345) stated that “regulation of cognition (…) refers to the effectiveness with 
which learners keep track of ongoing cognitive processes and their employment of regulatory strategies in order to 
solve problems”. Metacognition includes the knowledge regarding cognition and the regulation of cognition; these 
processes control and monitor an individual’s decisions and actions (Stankov, 2013). Metacognitive monitoring 
concerns the link between the performance and the judgment regarding the same performance (Boekaerts & 
Rozendaal, 2010; Gutierrez, Schraw, Kuch, & Richmond, 2016). Additionally, metacognitive confidence denotes a 
specific judgment expressed in relation to performance (Dinsmore & Parkinson, 2013; Schraw, 2009). The item-
specific confidence is referred to in the literature as comprehension monitoring, metacognition, metamemory and 
feeling of knowing (Lundeberg, Fox, & Punćochaŕ, 1994).  
The theories on self-regulated learning (Boekaerts, 1997; Pintrich, 2000) highlight the role of the processes 
applied by students to set goals, assess the advancements towards these goals, and modify and regulate their 
performance on the basis of this monitoring process. Focusing on the relation between the cognitive performance 
and confidence in their correctness, studies have highlighted two different potential outcomes: overconfidence, 
when subjects have the illusion of knowing; and underconfidence, when subjects have the illusion of not knowing 
(Serra & Metcalfe, 2009). In other cases, the subjects properly judge the correctness vs incorrectness of their 
performance (Gutierrez et al., 2016).  
In the literature, many authors have indicated that confidence is dependent on the context (items correct or 
incorrect) and the specific domain assessed (Glenberg & Epstein, 1987; Lundeberg et al., 1994). Also, other scholars 
(Dinsmore & Parkinson, 2013) have highlighted that the individual, in the development of confidence judgments, 
refers to many aspects, including the prior knowledge, the task features and the framework.  
Among the dimensions that affect the confidence in the correctness of a response, the previous knowledge and 
abilities play key roles. Specifically, the effects of numerical abilities have been investigated to account for their 
effects on our domain of interest, i.e., probabilistic reasoning (Garcia-Retamero & Hoffrage, 2013; Lalonde & 
Gardner, 1993; Nietfeld & Schraw, 2002). In addition, the effects of visuospatial abilities have been considered, 
accounting for the skill in understanding and transforming symbolic and non-linguistic data (Gardner, 1993). These 
abilities exhibited specific relationships with achievement in mathematics and statistics and their corresponding 
confidence in the correctness of responses (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2013; Kellen, Chan, & Fang, 2013; Maloney, 
Waechter, Risko, & Fugelsang, 2012). Moreover, attitudes towards statistics have also been investigated. They 
represent a compound concept, related to the positive versus negative dispositions towards statistical and 
probabilistic disciplines (Chiesi & Primi, 2009; Gal, Garfield, & Gal, 1997). These attitudes may have a significant 
effect on the strategies applied by students when they cope with these probabilistic problems. Additionally, the 
role of statistical anxiety has been inquired; in this regard, many authors have highlighted the relation between this 
construct and performance in statistical and probabilistic problems (Onwuegbuzie, 1995; Primi & Chiesi, 2016).  
As well, among the context features that potentially affect probabilistic reasoning and the relative metacognitive 
processes, a relevant role of the presence versus absence of time pressure must be recognized (Beilock, Kulp, Holt, 
& Carr, 2004; Kleiner, 2014). Namely, time constraints may interact with the previously described dimensions, 
explicitly with statistical anxiety and attitudes (Tobias & Everson, 2009). However, the findings related to the 
potential influence of time pressure on mathematical and probabilistic problem solving are controversial. Some 
scholars have highlighted that the presence of time pressure may support performance in these tasks (Hanoch & 
Vitouch, 2004; Markman, Maddox, & Worthy, 2006). In contrast, other authors have emphasized that time pressure 
may impede the application of correct solution strategies, for example, by affecting and overloading the working 
memory (Beilock & Carr, 2005; DeCaro, Thomas, Albert, & Beilock, 2011). Researchers have developed the 
“Distraction theories” (Beilock & Carr, 2005), which indicate that time pressure produces a disturbing setting that 
draws attention away from the task. These theories have been challenged by the “Explicit monitoring theories”, 
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which suggest that time limits may stimulate more attention to the specific problem, strategies and procedures 
(Beilock et al., 2004). 
The Calibration of Confidence and its Measures 
The calibration of confidence is defined as the relationship between performance in a task and confidence in the 
correctness of this task (Alexander, 2013; Boekaerts & Rozendaal, 2010; Gutierrez et al., 2016; Schraw, 2009). This 
concept is related to the amount of matching between a subject’s judgments on his/her performance and the 
effective performance gathered (Alexander, 2013). The role of calibration in accounting for performance is 
important because the subject’s judgments regarding the ongoing task affect their ensuing effort and the application 
of specific solution strategies (Alexander, 2013). According to Dunlosky and Thiede (2013), in general, research 
regarding calibration focuses on four themes, defined as “cornerstones”: judgment bases (the investigation of 
individuals’ construction of metacognitive judgments), judgment accuracy (the analysis of the matching between 
metacognitive judgments and performance), reliability and stability (the study of the constancy and reliability of 
the judgments), and control (the investigation of the use of metacognitive judgments to control the developing 
procedures).  
Schraw (2009) agreed that many different variables might affect metacognition and calibration. Among these, 
we may include the variables that characterise individual differences (e.g., anxiety, attitudes, abilities, knowledge, 
working memory, executive functions, and cultural context) (Buratti & Allwood, 2015). Dinsmore and Parkinson 
(2013) remarked that the calibration is affected by the individual’s knowledge; specifically, the activation of an 
unappropriated knowledge may adversely affect confidence judgments and their calibration during performance. 
In addition, the format and difficulty of the problem may have an impact on the calibration (Schraw, 2009); their 
influence concerns the type of judgment required and the timing of the judgment that refers to the task. Schraw 
(2009) introduced different types of metacognitive judgments, which refer to the moment in which the 
metacognitive judgment is expressed in relation to the performance: prospective (the prediction prior to acting out 
the assignment), concurrent (the judgment is settled whereas the task is carried out), and retrospective (the 
judgment is expressed after the performance).  
To account for all aspects implied in the calibration, in the literature there are different types of measures that 
aim to assess the “goodness of fit between a confidence judgment and the corresponding performance” (Schraw, 
2009, p. 425). In this study, the choice of the calibration indices to be used has been related to practical considerations 
on concrete issues related to the features of the research protocol (Rutherford, 2017). Among the measures of 
calibration, we distinguish between the measures of absolute accuracy and the measures of relative accuracy 
(Dougherty & Sprenger, 2006; Schraw, 2009).  
The measures of absolute accuracy regard the deviation between the confidence and the performance of a task; 
these measures are useful when a researcher is interested in determining whether a specific format or treatment 
may enhance the calibration between the performance and confidence (Bol & Hacker, 2001; Bol, Hacker, O’Shea, & 
Allen, 2005). Among these types of measures, the Bias Index (refer to Formula 1 in the Method section) is computed 
in such a way as to evaluate the direction and the range of the lack of correlation between performance and 
confidence. It assesses over-confidence and under-confidence in the judgments (Jackson & Kleitman, 2013; Schraw, 
2009). This index ranges from -1 to +1; a value greater than zero indicates overconfidence, whereas a value less than 
zero indicates underconfidence (Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977). This index indicates whether the student was able 
to distinguish the tasks that, for him/her, are more difficult or easier, thereby producing judgments that reflect 
her/his effective level of performance in the tasks (Stankov & Crawford, 1997; Stankov et al., 2012). 
Among the other measures of calibration, there are indices of the relative accuracy, which assess the consistency 
of confidence and performance across a set of tasks. In this regard, the Confidence-Judgment Accuracy Quotient 
(CAQ Index) (refer to Formula 2 in the Method section) assesses the individual’s ability to distinguish between 
confidence for the correct items and the confidence for the incorrect items (Boekaerts & Rozendaal, 2010; Jackson & 
Kleitman, 2013; Schraw, 2009; Shaughnessy, 1979). The values of the CAQ may be positive when confidence in the 
correct answers to some items is higher than in the incorrect answers to other items. The values may be less than 
zero when confidence in the incorrect answers to some items is higher than in the correct answers to other items 
(Jackson & Kleitman, 2013).  
To measure the calibration, Schraw (2009) recommends the use different indices that assess dissimilar aspects 
of the metacognitive processes. It has been established that the approach used to compute specific calibration 
measures may affect the findings of the investigation (Rutherford, 2017). Specifically, the indices of Absolute 
Accuracy are useful to evaluate the exactness of judgments, whereas, the indices of Relative Accuracy are useful to 
evaluate the correspondence between performance and the confidence judgments (Alexander, 2013; Jackson & 
Kleitman, 2013; Schraw, 2009). Consequently, the two types of calibration indices described above (Bias and CAQ 
Indices – which assess Absolute and Relative accuracy) are both useful. It may be shown that they are statistically 
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independent (an individual could have a discrete absolute accuracy and a low relative accuracy; on the other hand, 
it is possible to observe the opposite) (Dunlosky & Thiede, 2013; Schraw, 2009). 
Aims 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the potential differences in the confidence and calibration between 
confidence judgments and performance for probabilistic problems presented in two formats (verbal-numerical and 
graphical-pictorial formats, shortly denoted, respectively, as N format and G format) in psychology 
undergraduates. The participants were asked to rate their confidence in the correctness of their answer to the 
previously provided task. We are interested in retrospective judgments expressed item-by-item. The domain 
assessed (the probabilistic reasoning) was unfamiliar to the participants, because they did not have specific 
knowledge regarding it. 
This research aims to assess whether the use of graphical-pictorial representations improves the confidence and 
the calibration between confidence and accuracy in probabilistic reasoning (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2017). In 
particular, we aim to assess whether the graphical-pictorial representations affect data encoding, thereby 
supporting the calibration of confidence and reducing overconfidence or underconfidence (Stankov & Crawford, 
1996; Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). Specifically, we may suppose that graphical-pictorial 
representations are useful to first increase confidence in one’s performance and thus the calibration between 
confidence and accuracy. We also suppose that this finding may be more plausible for students with low numeracy 
skills (Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2013) and high visuospatial abilities (Kellen et al., 2013). 
These relationships will be investigated by controlling the effects of dimensions related to individual differences 
(e.g., numerical and visuospatial abilities, attitudes towards statistics and statistical anxiety) and contextual aspects 
(e.g., the presence vs. absence of time pressure) (Beilock et al., 2004; Evans, Handley, & Bacon, 2009). 
To investigate these aspects, following Schraw’s advice (2009), two measures have been computed to assess the 
calibration between confidence and accuracy: one index of the Absolute Accuracy (the Bias index) (Boekaerts & 
Rozendaal, 2010; Was, 2014) and one index of the Relative Accuracy (Confidence-Judgment Accuracy Quotient; 
CAQ) (Jackson & Kleitman, 2013; Shaughnessy, 1979). All indices were computed on the set of items on probabilistic 
reasoning in the Numerical format and, separately, on the set of items in the Graphical format (Agus et al., 2015b).  
Besides, these relationships were assessed disjointedly in two samples of psychology undergraduates without 
statistical expertise, who belonged to two countries in the European Higher Education Area: Italy and Spain.  
To summarize, in the present study, we aim to investigate whether undergraduates may discern the cases in 
which they know the answer from the cases in which they do not know the answer. The questions of distinctive 
interest guiding the research are as follows:  
 Do students differ in confidence for Graphical versus Numerical format problems? Are undergraduates more confident 
in problems in the Graphical format than in the Numerical format?  
 Are students differently calibrated in confidence in Numerical versus Graphical format problems?  
 Do individual differences and time pressure affect confidence judgments? Do numerical and visuospatial abilities, 
statistical anxiety, attitudes towards statistics and time pressure affect the retrospective confidence judgments 
expressed in the two formats of problem presentation? 
 Do individual differences and time pressure affect confidence judgments calibration?  
 What is the effect of abilities (numerical and visuospatial), statistical anxiety, attitudes towards statistics and time 
pressure on the calibration in the two formats of problem presentation?  
 Do the Bias Index and the CAQ index differ in assessment across the two formats? Are there differences in the relation 
to the two indices of calibration computed (the Bias Index and the CAQ Index)? Is the Bias Index significantly different 
from zero in the two formats (when the value zero indicates a good calibration between confidence and accuracy)? Is 
the CAQ significantly different from zero in the two formats (when the positive value indicates higher confidence in 
the correct items and the negative value indicates higher confidence in the incorrect items)?  
All these dimensions were examined separately for Italian and Spanish undergraduates in psychology; indeed, 
we assume that Italian undergraduates’ calibration indices might differ from the Spanish ones in conditions of time 
pressure. In fact, in the literature it has been suggested that Italian students show better performances in 
probabilistic reasoning in presence of time pressure, when compared to Spanish students (Agus et al., 2015b). 
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Two hundred fifty-seven first year Psychology students (28.80% males; age M= 19.76 years, SD = 3.48, age range 
= 17-52), who were recruited by a non-probabilistic sampling from Universities in Italy (Milan n=82; Rome n=66) 
and Spain (Barcelona n=109), participated in this study. All subjects voluntarily contributed; they did not have an 
incentive for participation. 
Procedure 
The protocol was completed by the undergraduates in paper-and-pencil format. Only the undergraduates who 
fulfilled all sections of the research protocol were included in the sample. 
The administration occurred in quiet rooms in large groups, and the students completed the protocol in one 
work session. The participants differed in relation to the presence vs absence of time pressure. The session lasted 
approximately 50 minutes for the participants who worked in the time pressure condition (n=112, 43.6%). The 
participants who worked without time pressure did not have a time constriction (n=145, 56.4%). 
Every participant completed all questionnaires comprising the research protocol and both formats of items 
(Numerical and Graphical formats). Also, to present the items in different positions in the protocol, the 
administration was randomly structured, with the application of changed and reversed orders of presentation (NG, 
at first Numerical then Graphical format, contrasted with GN, in the beginning Numerical then Graphical format) 
and sequences (1 and 2, the second overturned with respect to the first). For these reasons, in the protocol, there are 
four modalities of item administration (for the modality NG1 20.2%, NG2 26.5%, GN1 24.5% and GN2 28.8%). 
Measures 
The questionnaires were administered in a large battery, in which the first part assessed the demographic 
variables (age, gender, and curricula). The following sections evaluated the relevant dimensions identified in the 
research design. 
Numerical and visuospatial abilities 
The two starting sections of the protocol assessed the Numerical and Visuospatial abilities using the 
Intermediate Form of Primary Mental Abilities (PMA) (Thurstone & Thurstone, 1981, 1987). Specifically, these 
scales were selected because of their validity in the measurement of numerical abilities, as well as the detection of 
spatial relationships and spatial patterns in both adolescents and undergraduates (aspects strongly involved in the 
comprehension of relations embodied in the presentation of graphical devices) (Colom, Contreras, Botella, & 
Santacreu, 2002; Hegarty & Kozhevnikov, 1999). 
Probabilistic reasoning 
The succeeding sections assessed the basic probabilistic reasoning (in relation to simple and conditional 
probabilities) in the Numerical and Graphical formats; all items referred to the simple mathematical achievement 
reached during high school (Agus et al., 2016). This section incorporated five items; these related to the classical 
problems examined in the literature; specifically, one problem dealt with classical medical diagnoses (for similar 
problems see, for example Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Sloman, Over, Slovak, & Stibel, 2003); one was about decks of 
cards (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974); one was about the outcomes of university examinations (Girotto & Gonzalez, 
2001), one was about the roll of dices (Watson & Moritz, 2003); and one was about production defects in a factory 
(for an example see Appendix; for the questionnaire validation in Italy and Spain refer to (Agus et al., 2016)).  
In the Graphical format, we used pictorial-graphical devices (such as tree diagrams and iconic drawings), 
similar to the devices reported in the classical studies conducted on these subjects (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996; Moro 
& Bodanza, 2010; Yamagishi, 2003). Each item in both formats included four closed response options (with only 
one correct option), followed by an open-ended question to explain the reasoning applied in the problem-solving.  
We used a numerical and graphical pictorial format of the problems, expressed by frequencies, referring to 
classic works in the literature on this topic (Brase, 2009; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Moro et al., 2011).  
This assessment instrument was developed and validated in the Italian and Spanish versions (then each 
undergraduate fulfilled the protocol in his/her native language). To assess probabilistic reasoning, we summed the 
number of correct responses for both Numerical and Graphical scales. 
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The confidence in the correctness of the response previously provided was assessed using a Likert scale (from 
1 = “not confident” to 5 = “completely confident”) associated with each item (for an example see the Appendix) 
(Agus et al., 2016). 
Attitude towards statistics 
The Survey of Attitudes Toward Statistics (SATS-28) (Dauphinee, Schau, & Stevens, 1997) constituted the 
subsequent section of the protocol, which assessed four scales (Affect - six items; Difficulty - seven items; Cognitive 
Competence - six items; and Value - nine items) using 7-point Likert scales (from 1 = “strongly disagree”, to 7 = 
“strongly agree”). For each participant, we administered the adapted version in his/her native language. The 
Cronbach’s α were acceptable for both the Italian (.60; .81) and Spanish (.64; .90) versions (Carmona, Primi, & Chiesi, 
2008; Chiesi & Primi, 2009). 
Statistical anxiety 
The final part of the protocol comprised the Statistical Anxiety Scale (SAS) (Chiesi et al., 2011; Vigil-Colet, 
Lorenzo-Seva, & Condon, 2008). This instrument included 24 items, assessed using a 5-point Likert scale. The scales 
investigated three dimensions: Examination, Interpretation and Asking for Help. The undergraduates completed 
the Italian or Spanish versions of the items. The scale exhibited good internal consistency (.85; .90 for the Italian 
version; .81; .92 for the Spanish version) (Chiesi et al., 2011; Vigil-Colet et al., 2008). 
Data Analyses 
The statistical data were analysed using R (version 3.6.0) and SPSS (version 22) software.  
We independently analysed the samples of Italian and Spanish undergraduates, extracted from different 
populations. The protocols were assessed in relation to the potential effect of order and sequences, but no significant 
effect was identified in the Italian and Spanish universities (Agus et al., 2015a, 2015b).  
We applied the calibration indices of the Absolute (Bias Index) (see Formula 1) and Relative Accuracy (CAQ) 
(see Formula 2) as defined in literature (e.g., Boekaerts & Rozendaal, 2010). The computation was carried out 
referring to the following formulae [(1) and (2)].  
Specifically in the Bias Index (Jackson & Kleitman, 2013; Schraw, 2009) 




  (1) 
ci is the confidence rating for item i, and pi is the accuracy of the answer to item i (scored 1 in the case of a correct 
response and 0 in the case of an incorrect response). To compute the Bias Index, for each item, we recoded the Likert 
Scale confidence ratings in a dummy variable: low confidence = 0 (from 1 – not at all confident – to 3 - moderately 
confident), high confidence = 1 (from 4 – very confident - to 5 – extremely confident) (Jackson & Kleitman, 2013; 
Mevel et al., 2014; Stupple, Ball, & Ellis, 2013). 
In the CAQ Index (Boekaerts & Rozendaal, 2010; Schneider, 2011; Shaughnessy, 1979) 
 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = �∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑝 − ∑ 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑞𝑞 �
𝜎𝜎
 (2) 
ci correct is the confidence rating for the correct answer to the ith item, p represents the number of items with 
correct responses, ci incorrect is the confidence rating for the incorrect answer to the ith item, q represents the 
number of items with incorrect responses, and ơ is the standard deviation calculated across all confidence ratings 
(Jackson & Kleitman, 2013).  
We computed the descriptive statistical indices related to the mean of the scales, the confidence scores and the 
calibration indices. 
The coefficient of the Bivariate Correlation Pearson’s r was applied to assess the linear relationships between 
the inquired dimensions. 
To compare the confidence in the answers to the probabilistic problems presented in the Numerical and 
Graphical formats (assumed as dependent variables), we subsequently performed a Mixed Design Analysis of 
Covariance, controlling for the effects of other study variables (assumed as covariates - numerical and visuospatial 
abilities, anxiety and attitudes); the variable “presence vs absence of time pressure” distinguished between two 
groups of independent observations. The values of partial Eta Squared (pƞ2) were applied to evaluate the effect size 
of specific dimensions in our dependent variables, partialising the effects of other factors and of interactions (Cohen, 
1973; Pierce, Block, & Aguinis, 2004; Richardson, 2011). The rules of thumb suggested by Ferguson (2009) reported 
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a limit value of .04 for a small effect, .25 for a moderate effect and .64 for a strong effect. The assumptions for the 
application of these analyses (univariate normality, homogeneity of inter-correlations and homogeneity of 
variance) were verified and met in the samples (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  
We subsequently performed other Mixed Design ANCOVAs to compare the indices of the calibration in the 
Numerical and Graphical formats (used as dependent variables), controlling for the effects of the dimensions 
described above (abilities, attitudes and statistical anxiety) and the influence of the time constraint. These analyses 
were applied separately for the Bias indices and the CAQ Indices. In these analyses, the assumptions were met in 
the samples (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996) and the partial Eta Squared was considered in relation to the significant 
effects (Richardson, 2011).  
Finally, to evaluate whether the indices of the calibration (Bias and CAQ Indices) were significantly different 
from the zero value, Student’s t tests were computed in relation to both samples, separately for the N and G formats 
of problem presentation and distinctively for the subjects working with and without time pressure. In these 
comparisons the Cohen’s d was computed to evaluate the effect sizes of significant differences highlighted (Cohen, 
1977). These analyses were useful to determine the presence of underconfidence or overconfidence in the set of 
problems in Numerical and Graphical formats (concerning the Bias Index). Additionally, they were performed to 
assess whether there is higher confidence in the correct vs incorrect performances (referring to the CAQ Index). 
RESULTS 
In order to examine the distributions of the variables in Italian and Spanish undergraduates, the descriptive 
statistics were computed separately for two countries (minimum, maximum, median, mean and standard 
deviation). Table 1 presents these statistics for the variables included in this study (number of correct responses in 
probabilistic reasoning in two formats, confidence in the correctness of these responses, PMA dimensions, SAS and 
SATS scales, Bias and CAQ indices for both formats). 
To assess the linear relationships between the calibration indices, the Pearson’s r coefficient was computed on 
the values concerning all conditions (in the presence and absence of time pressure) (Table 2). The pattern of the 
correlations in the Italian and Spanish undergraduates showed the same trend for the Bias Index. In both samples, 
we identified a positive and significant correlation between the Bias Index computed for the N and G formats (r= 
.598, p<.01 for Italians, r=.387, p<.01 for Spanish) (Table 2). In contrast, we determined that the CAQ indices for the 
N and G formats did not exhibit significant correlations. Also, there is a negative linear relationship between the 
CAQ in the G format and the Bias Index for the N format (r=-.195, p<.05) only for the Italians. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
   Spain n=109  Italy n=128 
 Min Max Mdn Mean sd   Min Max Mdn Mean sd 
FN correct responses 1 4 2.000 1.972 1.022   0 5 2.000 2.608 1.353 
FG correct responses 1 4 2.000 2.330 1.054   1 5 3.000 3.027 1.142 
PMA Visuospatial scale 3 54 26.000 25.834 11.184   0 53 22.000 21.135 10.151 
PMA Numerical scale 5 35 16.000 16.752 5.899   7 40 18.000 17.705 5.805 
SAS Examination 14 40 33.000 31.981 6.210   3 40 33.000 31.812 7.824 
SAS Interpretation 8 32 18.000 18.102 5.432   2 32 17.000 16.210 5.718 
SAS Help 8 33 17.000 16.981 7.385   1 40 17.000 16.766 7.309 
SATS Affect 11 35 22.000 21.862 4.967   7 31 20.000 19.224 5.578 
SATS Competence 15 39 28.000 27.816 4.647   11 36 26.000 25.197 5.248 
SATS Value 27 61 48.000 47.642 8.192   21 63 45.000 44.619 8.264 
SATS Difficulty 13 43 27.000 26.669 5.622   13 36 26.000 25.115 5.253 
FN Confidence 1.50 4.80 3.400 3.302 .753   1.00 4.80 3.200 3.109 .912 
FG Confidence 1.33 4.80 3.750 3.550 .820   1.20 4.80 3.500 3.229 .904 
Bias FN -.80 .80 .000 .040 .307   -1.00 .80 -.200 -.156 .341 
Bias FG -.60 .80 .000 .058 .308   -1.00 .40 .000 -.187 .358 
CAQ FN -1.39 4.33 1.118 1.089 1.068   -2.24 4.33 .775 .801 1.140 
CAQ FG -1.83 4.62 1.065 .9519 1.262   -1.22 6.00 1.593 1.258 1.241 
Note: FN correct responses = Correct responses in numerical format of problem. FG correct responses = Correct responses in graphical format of 
problem; PMA= Primary Mental Abilities Questionnaire; SAS = Statistical Anxiety Scale; SATS = Survey of Attitudes toward Statistics; Bias FN = Bias 
Index for numerical format; Bias FG = Bias Index for graphical format; CAQ FN = Confidence-Judgment Accuracy Quotient in numerical format; CAQ 
FG = Confidence-Judgment Accuracy Quotient in graphical format; SD = Standard Deviation; Mdn = median 
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This finding indicates that in both samples, higher under confidence in the Numerical format is correlated with 
higher under confidence in the Graphical format. Moreover, higher over confidence in the Numerical format is 
correlated with higher over confidence in the Graphical format. In contrast, the CAQ indices for the Numerical and 
Graphical formats did not highlight significant linear correlations. 
Do Students Differ in Confidence for Graphical versus Numerical Format Problems? Do 
Individual Differences and Time Pressure Affect Confidence Judgment? 
To assess the effect of the problem format (Numerical and Graphical) on the confidence in probabilistic 
reasoning, an Analysis of Covariance with a Mixed Design was conducted (separately for the Italian and Spanish 
undergraduates), in which the means of the confidence in the correctness of the problems in the Numerical and 
Graphical formats were used as repeated measures. The presence vs absence of time pressure was used as a between 
factor. The scales of the numerical and visuospatial abilities, statistical anxiety and attitudes towards statistics were 
assumed as covariates (Table 3). 
In the Spanish undergraduates, there was no main effect of the repeated measures (Wilks’ Lambda = .994, p= 
.460). Moreover, none of the covariates exerted a significant effect on the mean confidence in the correctness of the 
Table 2. Pearson’s r linear correlations between indices of calibration (above the diagonal, the values for Spanish undergraduates; 
below the diagonal, the values for Italians) 
  1 2 3 4 
1 Bias FN 1 .387** -.049 .016 
2 Bias FG .598** 1 -.033 .147 
3 CAQ FN -.054 .032 1 -.076 
4 CAQ FG -.195* -.061 .111 1 
Note: p<.05*; p<.01**; Bias FN = Bias Index for numerical format; Bias FG = Bias Index for graphical format; CAQ FN = Confidence-Judgment Accuracy 
Quotient in numerical format; CAQ FG = Confidence-Judgment Accuracy Quotient in graphical format 
Table 3. Results of mixed design Ancova (dependent variable – Confidence) 
Sample Source Wilks’ Lambda F p Partial ƞ2 
Spanish sample 
 
Format .994  .460  
Format * SAS Examination .998  .629  
Format * SAS Interpretation .993  .417  
Format * SAS Help .999  .739  
Format * SATS Affect .999  .743  
Format * SATS Competence .990  .324  
Format * SATS Value .994  .467  
Format * SATS Difficulty 1.000  .957  
Format * PMA Visuo-spatial scale .990  .325  
Format * PMA Numeric scale .998  .646  
Format* Time pressure .980  .169  
Significant Between-Subjects Effects     
SATS Affect  6.054 (df=1;96) .016* .059 
PMA Numeric scale  4.147 (df=1;96) .044* .041 
Italian sample 
 
Format .988  .230  
Format * SAS Examination .998  .635  
Format * SAS Interpretation 1.000  .998  
Format * SAS Help .996  .487  
Format * SATS Affect .964 4.388 (df=1;118) .038* .036 
Format * SATS Competence 1.000  .951  
Format * SATS Value .951 6.105 (df=1;118) .015* .049 
Format * SATS Difficulty .983  .159  
Format * PMA Visuo-spatial scale .999  .803  
Format * PMA Numeric scale 1.000  .964  
Format * Time pressure .970  .059  
Significant Between-Subjects Effects     
SATS Affect  8.901 (df=1;118) .003** .070 
SATS Competence  8.419 (df=1;118) .004** .067 
PMA Numeric scale  6.185 (df=1;118) .014* .050 
Note: **p < .01; *p < .05; Partial ƞ2 = partial Eta Squared for significant differences; PMA= Primary Mental Abilities Questionnaire; SAS = Statistical 
Anxiety Scale; SATS = Survey of Attitudes toward Statistics 
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responses in the N and G formats (Table 3). We could observe small significant values of the Between Subjects 
Effect for the Sats Affect (F(1;96)=6.054, p=.016, partial ƞ2=.059), and PMA Numerical scale (F(1;96)=4.147, p=.044, 
partial ƞ2=.041). 
In the Italian sample, there was no main effect of the within factor (Wilks’ Lambda = .988, p= .230). However, 
there were small significant effects of the interaction Format*Sats Affect (Wilks’ Lambda = .964; F(1;118) = 4.388; p= 
.038; partial ƞ2=.036) and Format*Sats Value (Wilks’ Lambda = .951; F(1;118) =6.105; p= .015; partial ƞ2= .049); the 
other effects were not significant. We identified small significant values of the Between Subjects Effect for the Sats 
Affect (F(1;118)=8.901, p=.003, partial ƞ2=.070), Sats Competence (F(1;118)=8.419, p=.004, partial ƞ2=.067), and PMA 
Numerical (F(1;118)=6.185, p=.014, partial ƞ2=.050). 
These data indicated that there are no significant differences in the confidence expressed in the answers to 
problems in the Numerical and Graphical formats for both samples of Spanish and Italian undergraduates; 
however, there is a small effect of attitudes towards statistics and numerical abilities. 
Are Students Differently Calibrated in Confidence in Numerical versus Graphical Format 
Problems? Do Individual Differences and Time Pressure Affect Calibration? 
To further investigate these aspects, we assessed whether there were differences in the calibration in the 
Numerical and Graphical formats. Mixed Design ANCOVAs were conducted separately for the Italian and Spanish 
students.  
The first Mixed ANCOVA analysis was performed using the Bias Index in the Numerical and Graphical formats 
as the repeated measures; the presence vs absence of time pressure was used as a between factor; the scales of the 
numerical and visuospatial abilities, statistical anxiety and attitudes towards statistics were assumed as covariates 
(Table 4). The second Mixed ANCOVA was conducted using the CAQ Index in the N and G formats as the repeated 
measures; the presence vs absence of time pressure was used as a between factor; the scales of the numerical and 
visuospatial abilities, statistical anxiety and attitudes towards statistics were assumed as covariates (Table 5). 
Table 4. Results of mixed design Ancova (dependent variable – Bias Index) 
Sample Source Wilks’ Lambda F p Partial ƞ2 
Spanish sample 
 
Format .992  .384  
Format * SAS Examination .982  .189  
Format * SAS Interpretation .993  .397  
Format * SAS Help 1.000  .932  
Format * SATS Affect .995  .469  
Format * SATS Competence 1.000  .894  
Format * SATS Value .992  .393  
Format * SATS Difficulty 1.000  .908  
Format * PMA Visuo-spatial scale .989  .305  
Format * PMA Numeric scale .986  .241  
Format* Time pressure .999  .751  
Significant Between-Subjects Effects     
SATS Affect  4.302 (df=1;96) .041* .043 
Italian sample 
 
Format .998  .649  
Format * SAS Examination .998  .622  
Format * SAS Interpretation .994  .396  
Format * SAS Help .999  .746  
Format * SATS Affect .976  .089  
Format * SATS Competence .996  .509  
Format * SATS Value .974  .080  
Format * SATS Difficulty .997  .528  
Format * PMA Visuo-spatial scale .990  .286  
Format * PMA Numeric scale .985  .184  
Format* Time pressure .942  .008** .050 
Significant Between-Subjects Effects     
Time pressure  7.263 (df=1;118) .008** .058 
Note: **p < .01; *p < .05; Partial ƞ2 = partial Eta Squared for significant differences; PMA= Primary Mental Abilities Questionnaire; SAS = Statistical 
Anxiety Scale; SATS = Survey of Attitudes toward Statistics 
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Regarding the Bias Index, in the Spanish undergraduates, there was no main effect of the repeated measures 
(Wilks’ Lambda = .992, p= .384) (Table 4). Also, the covariates did not exert a significant effect on the mean 
confidence in the correctness of the responses in the Numerical and Graphical formats (Table 4). The scale of SATS 
Affect has a significant effect for Between Subject test (F(1;96) = 4.302, p= .041; partial ƞ2= .043). 
In the Italian sample, there was no main effect of the within factor (Wilks’ Lambda = .998, p= .649) or significant 
effects of the interaction among the within factor and the covariates. It is highlighted that there is a small significant 
effect of interaction of Format * Time pressure (Wilks’ Lambda = .942, p= .008; partial ƞ2= .050) (see Figure 1). Time 
pressure also has a significant effect for Between Subject test (F(1;118) = 7.263, p= .008; partial ƞ2= .058). 
In relation to the application of the same analyses for the CAQ Index, in the Spanish sample, there was no 
significant effect for the within factor test (Wilks’ Lambda = .999, p= .763) or the covariates (Table 5). The time 
pressure exerts a significant effect in the Between Subjects test (F(1;96) = 8.321; p= .005; partial ƞ2 = .080). In the Italian 
Table 5. Results of the mixed design Ancova (dependent variable – CAQ) 
Sample Source Wilks’ Lambda F p Partial ƞ2 
Spanish sample 
Format .999  .763  
Format * SAS Examination .997  .717  
Format * SAS Interpretation .997  .577  
Format * SAS Help .996  .556  
Format * SATS Affect .999  .726  
Format * SATS Competence .999  .783  
Format * SATS Value .998  .652  
Format * SATS Difficulty .990  .338  
Format * PMA Visuo-spatial .997  .609  
Format * PMA Numeric 1.000  .887  
Format* Time pressure .965  .067  
Significant Between-Subjects Effects     
Time pressure  8.321 (df=1;96) .005** .080 
Italian sample 
Format .991  .401  
Format * SAS Examination .993  .473  
Format * SAS Interpretation .999  .800  
Format * SAS Help .963  .095  
Format * SATS Affect .998  .701  
Format * SATS Competence 1.000  .957  
Format * SATS Value .999  .750  
Format * SATS Difficulty .991  .403  
Format * PMA Visuo-spatial .999  .803  
Format * PMA Numeric 1.000  .945  
Format* Time pressure .998  .671  
Note: **p < .01; *p < .05; Partial ƞ2 = partial Eta Squared for significant differences; PMA= Primary Mental Abilities Questionnaire; SAS = Statistical 
Anxiety Scale; SATS = Survey of Attitudes toward Statistics 
 
Figure 1. Estimated marginal means for the Bias Index in relation to the significant effect of Format*Time pressure in Italian 
undergraduates 
Note: TP Time pressure; NTP No Time Pressure; N Verbal numerical format; G Graphical pictorial format 
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undergraduates for the CAQ Indices, we note that there are no significant effects of Format; no further significant 
effects were identified.  
In summary, for the Italian students, the absolute index of Bias is affected by the interaction concerning the 
presence of time pressure and the format. However, the data suggested that for the Spanish undergraduates, there 
were no significant differences in the Bias expressed in the N and G formats. Thus, we speculate that there are no 
differences in the evaluation of the trend or the range of the gap between performance and confidence (i.e., 
overconfidence versus underconfidence in the judgments) for the Spanish students. In contrast, the Italian 
undergraduates exhibited a dissimilar ability to distinguish between simple and complex tasks in the N and G 
formats (see Figure 1). Specifically, in the N format, the Bias index is similar both in the presence and absence of 
time pressure (together characterized by underconfidence). For the G format, in the absence of time pressure, we 
may observe a stronger underconfidence (lower level of bias index) than in the presence of time constraints. For the 
G format in time pressure, the Italians clearly showed a Bias index close to zero, which indicates a better calibration 
between performance and confidence.  
In relation to the CAQ Index, defined as the assessment of individual ability to distinguish between the 
confidence for the correct items and the confidence for the incorrect items, the data suggested that there are no 
significant differences in the indices in the N and G formats for both samples. All undergraduates exhibited higher 
levels of confidence in relation to the problems solved correctly (CAQ > 0). 
Do the Bias Index and the CAQ Index Differ in Assessment across the Two Formats? Are 
there Differences in the Relation to the Two Indices of Calibration Computed? 
To assess the goodness of the calibration between confidence and accuracy in probabilistic reasoning in two 
formats (N and G), we applied Student’s t tests for each sample (Italian and Spanish undergraduates). This 
assessment was conducted for the calibration indices of the Bias and CAQ in both formats, as well as distinguishing 
between the indices concerning the administrations in conditions of the presence versus absence of time pressure. 
These analyses enabled us to account for the significant effect of the time pressure previously identified in this 
study. 
In Table 6, it is highlighted that for the Spanish undergraduates, there is a good calibration in the N format, 
whereas in the G format, there is significant overconfidence for the total sample (working with and without time 
pressure). In contrast, for the Italian students, there is significant underconfidence in both formats of problem 
presentation. 
It is highlighted that students (both Italian and Spanish) report CAQ values significantly higher than zero, 
which indicates greater confidence in the correct items, both for the Numerical and Graphical formats in the 
presence and absence of time pressure (Table 6). They appear to exhibit good levels of discrimination between 
incorrect and correct judgments, evidencing an appropriate adjustment of the confidence between the problems 
solved incorrectly and correctly. In relation to the effect of the time pressure identified for the Italians, at the 
descriptive level, it is interesting to observe that the CAQ Index in the Numerical format is higher in the presence 
of time pressure, whereas the CAQ Index in the Graphical format is higher in the absence of time pressure. 
Table 6. Student’s t Test to assess the difference in the calibration indices from zero 
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Note: p<.05* p<.01**; No TP= absence of time pressure; TP=presence of time pressure; IT = Italian ; ES = Spanish; sd=standard deviation; t= Student’s 
t test; df= degrees of freedom; Bias FN = Bias Index for numerical format; Bias FG = Bias Index for graphical format; CAQ FN = Confidence-Judgment 
Accuracy Quotient in numerical format; CAQ FG = Confidence-Judgment Accuracy Quotient in graphical format; Cohen’s d = Cohen’s d Effect size 
for significant differences 
 
 
EURASIA J Math Sci and Tech Ed 
 
13 / 21 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether undergraduates are distinctively confident and calibrated 
concerning their performance in probabilistic problem presentation in relation to different formats of problem 
presentation (verbal-numerical and graphical-pictorial).  
Specifically, we posed research questions that focused on the level of confidence and two different indices of 
calibration between confidence and accuracy: one index of the Absolute Accuracy, the Bias Index, and one index of 
the Relative Accuracy, the CAQ. We compared these variables computed distinctively in relation to a set of items 
in Numerical and Graphical formats, controlling for the effects of individual dimensions (e.g., attitudes towards 
statistics, visuospatial and numerical abilities, and statistical anxiety) and a contextual dimension (e.g., time 
pressure). The study was conducted with Italian and Spanish Psychology undergraduates in relation to a domain 
(the probabilistic reasoning) in which the participants did not have explicit knowledge.  
The relevance of the confidence and calibration in problem-solving has often been investigated in the literature 
(Jackson & Kleitman, 2014; Morony, Kleitman, Lee, & Stankov, 2013). Examining if students differ in confidence for 
Graphical versus Numerical format problems, our findings suggest that the level of confidence may be similar in 
relation to a specific type of problem (in this case, a probabilistic problem), regardless of the problem format 
(Numerical and Graphical). It is fascinating to observe that this confidence may be affected by the attitudes towards 
statistics and the numerical ability in both Italian and Spanish undergraduates. These data may support the 
hypothesis that the formats of problem presentation and time pressure did not exert an influence on the level of 
confidence of the correctness of the responses, which, to some extent, is related to the attitudes towards statistics 
and numerical abilities.  
These outcomes are plausible in relation to the statements of several authors (Jackson & Kleitman, 2014), which 
affirm that each subject tends to apply a stable style in metacognitive confidence judgments and their calibration.  
Likewise, these results may be understood in relation to the features of our psychology undergraduates, who 
did not have statistical and probabilistic expertise. The literature indicates the influence of previous knowledge in 
relation to the confidence and the calibration (Gutierrez & Schraw, 2015). Concerning this aspect, we note that in 
our samples, the absence of statistical and probabilistic knowledge has been used as an inclusion criterion in the 
study, defining a characteristic of our population. Besides, it was highlighted that problem-solving and confidence 
in solutions are based, in addition to previous knowledge, on solution strategies applied by the same subject in the 
past (Iannello, Perucca, Riva, Antonietti, & Pravettoni, 2015). The application of the previous solution strategies 
was conducted regardless of the potential discrepancies between the actual problem and the previous experiences. 
This finding may indicate that earlier experience, although not completely consistent with the proposed problems, 
may guide and affect probabilistic problem solving and confidence (Iannello et al., 2015; Riva, Monti, & Antonietti, 
2011). It is possible to speculate that because our undergraduates have no specific education in probabilistic 
reasoning, they tend to apply the same response pattern, the same strategies of solution, in both formats of problem 
presentation (N and G). Moreover, these aspects are consistent with the finding that confidence is a good predictor 
of accuracy in problem-solving in different formats of problem presentation (Jackson & Kleitman, 2014; Stankov et 
al., 2012).  
Regarding the question if the students are differently calibrated in confidence in Numerical versus Graphical 
format problems, if individual differences and time pressure affect confidence judgment and calibration, it was 
highlighted that the Italians and Spanish did not exhibit significant effects of the format and other inquired 
dimensions for the CAQ index. The CAQs in the N and G formats have values significantly higher than zero, which 
indicates higher confidence in the correct items in the presence and absence of time pressure. The undergraduates 
displayed well-meaning levels of discrimination, which demonstrates a notable adjustment of the confidence for 
the problems answered incorrectly and correctly.  
Nevertheless, concerning the assessment of the Bias Index, we note several specificities. In particular, consistent 
with a previous work (Agus et al., 2015a, 2015b) in which it was highlighted that the performance in probabilistic 
reasoning was improved in Italian undergraduates working in time pressure, we speculate that the Bias of 
calibration improves in the presence of time pressure, specifically in the problems in the Graphical format. This 
effect is highlighted only for Italian undergraduates and not for Spanish undergraduates. The Italians exhibited 
strong responsiveness to the assessment situations in which there were time limits (Kleiner, 2014).  
These findings may be related to many interacting dimensions. For example, regarding PISA mathematics 
achievement, Chiu and Xihua (2008) analysed the differences across 41 countries. The responses of thousands of 
students were assessed via multilevel statistical analyses, which highlighted fascinating differences in many 
countries, including Italy and Spain. The authors assessed family and motivation effects on mathematics 
achievement and indicated that these two countries have different scores in relation to the dimensions of 
“individualism” (higher for Italians) and “uncertainty avoidance” (higher for Spanish). The analyses also indicated 
other remarkable aspects that differentiated Italy and Spain. Specifically, the mathematical achievement for Italians 
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is positively and significantly affected by the interest in mathematics, self-efficacy and self-concept. In contrast, for 
Spanish students, the positive and significant effect of the foreign language at home, the cultural communication, 
the effort and the perseverance are highlighted; besides, there is a negative effect on the math achievement exerted 
by grandparents and the number of siblings (Chiu & Xihua, 2008). Moreover, Lee (2009) compared the levels of 
math self-concept, math self-efficacy and math anxiety and identified underlying differences across the 41 countries 
that participated in the PISA assessment. In particular, the Spanish students exhibited lower math anxiety than the 
Italians. We speculate that these differences may affect student performance in probabilistic problems, accounting 
for several differences between these two countries in their responsiveness to the presence of time limits. 
In relation to our data, we suppose that the probabilistic reasoning and calibration of Italians may be 
significantly and positively affected by the presence of time pressure, which appears to improve the performance 
and enhance the confidence calibration (reducing the values of the Bias Index).  
These discoveries may be consistent with the Distraction Theory (Beilock & Carr, 2005) and the research 
conducted by Markman et al. (2006). These authors indicated that a performance decline in mathematical problems 
under a time pressure condition (referred to as “choking”) may be related to interference in the application of 
explicit solution strategies in problem-solving. Markman et al. (2006) emphasized that a time pressure condition 
could induce a decline in the performance related to the application of a learned rule; alternatively, the time 
constraint could enhance the performance in the solution of problems that require the application of a holistic 
information integration strategy. The authors related these findings to working memory, which is overloaded in a 
time pressure condition and induces the individual to apply an information-integration strategy rather than 
hypothesis testing strategies (Markman et al., 2006). Additionally, consistent with these aspects, the research 
conducted by Maddox et al. (Maddox, Ashby, Ing, & Pickering, 2004) focused on the different categorization 
processes applied in learning and problem-solving situations. They highlighted that the explicit hypothesis-testing 
system is presumed to control the learning of rule-based category learning tasks, whereas the implicit procedural 
learning system controls the learning of information-integration category learning tasks. These different processes 
may be differentially affected by the presence of time pressure, in relation to the different roles of working memory 
and the dissimilar application of strategies (Markman et al., 2006).  
At this point, it may be useful to consider that in our research, the undergraduates did not have statistical 
knowledge; they did not master the correct strategies to solve the probabilistic problems presented. This aspect 
may be considered crucial to understanding the specificity of these findings. In problem-solving, they must refer 
to the basic strategies learned in the study of math in high school. For this reason, we speculate that in the 
probabilistic problem-solving, they had to apply a strategy only partially appropriate to the problem. Following 
this approach, we may observe that in the Graphical format, under time pressure, the subject may be supported in 
these processes and thus obtain better performances and exhibit better calibration between confidence and 
performance (Bias Indices close to zero).  
Gimmig et al. (Gimmig, Huguet, & Caverni, 2006) suggested that time pressure may overload the working 
memory and reduce the fluid reasoning abilities. This effect may be related to the subjective meaning given to the 
assessment and the task, thereby demonstrating a strong variability in relation to the cultural contexts, the domains 
and the personal relevance of the problem (Gimmig et al., 2006). Beyond the common identified sources of time 
pressure (both in the familial and working contexts), in the literature, many other dimensions have been identified 
that may powerfully affect the individual perception of time pressure (i.e., emotional and cognitive aspects, socio-
economic status, cultural and social meanings given to an activity) (Kleiner, 2014).  
Based on our data, we speculate that there is a difference in the perception and the meaning given to the time 
pressure in Spain and Italy. Our findings highlighted a specific sensitivity of Italian undergraduates to the presence 
of time pressure, which the Spanish students did not exhibit in a similar manner. These findings confirm the 
potential existing differences in Italian and Spanish students, yet sustained in literature (Agasisti & Cordero-
Ferrera, 2013; Agasisti & Pérez-Esparrells, 2010; Agus et al., 2019). 
These outcomes may also be underscored in relation to the classical models of metacognitive monitoring 
processes, which embrace the relevant roles of the interactions between social aspects, affect, external conditions 
and attitudes (Efklides, 2008). 
The dimension of time pressure is considered relevant in the Italian context. Namely, a previous study identified 
a “graphical facilitation effect” only in the time pressure condition for this population (Agus et al., 2015b). 
Specifically, it was observed that the presence of time pressure might enhance the engagement on a task and the 
application of functional solution strategies, thereby reducing the application of dysfunctional strategies, 
particularly in the Graphical format. Many authors in the literature highlighted the so-called “effect of graphical 
facilitation” in relation to the accuracy in probabilistic reasoning (Brase, 2009; Brase & Hill, 2015). The specificities 
of this effect require further investigations to understand the aspects implied. Additionally, these outcomes appear 
to highlight a new perspective in the description and comparison of the features of probabilistic reasoning in verbal-
numerical and graphical pictorial formats. 
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Nevertheless, our findings require supplementary investigations to further assess these aspects and overcome 
several limitations. The high number of variables included in the analyses could reduce the power of the statistical 
results. It may be useful to conduct the same analyses with larger samples of students, to confirm the relationships 
identified between the variables for Italian and Spanish undergraduates. Moreover, it may be interesting to assess 
the interaction effect between country and time pressure, to deepen the differences exhibited by these 
undergraduates in probabilistic reasoning. Still, it may be interesting to deepen the role of time pressure by 
administering probabilistic problems in other real-world circumstances, in which the time constraint is applied in 
different ways. It is also necessary to highlight that the present study could not consider the effects of other 
psychological dimensions, which may affect confidence and calibration (for example, the cognitive styles). Another 
limitation is related to the generalizability of these findings, because of the features of the examined subjects 
(Psychology undergraduates). The current findings deserve further investigation in future studies to clarify these 
features.  
The influence of the previously described social and cultural aspects may be observed in relation to the values 
of the Bias Index in the two countries. We speculate that Italians, who are more sensitive to the presence of time 
pressure, appear to enhance their accuracy and reduce the bias between accuracy and confidence (Bias of 
calibration) in the presence of time constraints. This improvement appears specifically in the graphical pictorial 
format, when the solution may likely be related to the application of different solution strategies of probabilistic 
problems with respect to the Numerical format.  
In summary, in this work it was highlighted that: 
• the levels of confidence in the correctness of response are analogous in N and G formats, both for Italians 
and Spaniards; furthermore, confidence is partially affected by numerical abilities and attitudes; 
• in Spanish undergraduates significant differences in the calibration (Bias index) are not observed in N and 
G formats; in Italians, the calibration between correctness and accuracy (Bias index) is significantly but weakly 
affected by the interaction Format * Time pressure; specifically, the calibration is similar in the N format in 
presence/absence of time pressure (when there is a significant underconfidence), but for the G format in time 
pressure there is a better calibration between performance and confidence. Regarding the CAQ index, for both 
countries, there are not significant differences in N and G formats, in which the students showed always higher 
confidence in the problems solved appropriately; 
• for the Spanish students, there is a virtuous calibration in the N format; in the G format, there is significant 
overconfidence; in contrast, for Italians there is significant underconfidence in both formats of problem 
presentation. 
Our data raise several inspiring questions for upcoming research. This study extends findings in relation to the 
key roles of confidence and calibration in probabilistic problem solving, which have to be assessed in relation to 
the presence vs. absence of time pressure. The findings provide a point of reflection in relation to the effect exerted 
by time constraint in probabilistic problem solving and the monitoring of cognitive processes. Likewise, 
considering the limitations of our work, these results may provide useful suggestions for individuals interested in 
designing better learning strategies suited to the domain of probabilistic problems. 
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APPENDIX (Agus et al., 2016) 
Item Example in Verbal-Numerical Format 
A factory produces electronic games, but not all of them work well. Of every 100 game products: 20 may have 
an electrical problem, 80 can work correctly. The company has developed control systems to identify faulty games; 
however, these systems do not work properly. In reality, half of the games with electrical problems continue in the 
production line, where they are considered as well functioning. If you randomly etract a game that has been sent 






What reasoning did you apply to solve this problem? 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the correctness of your response? 
Not at all confident Slightly confident A moderate amount confident Moderately confident Extremely confident 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Item Example in Graphical-Pictorial Format 
A factory that produces personal computers has problems in the production process. Some of the computers 
are defective (problems with the video card). Such problems are not always identified by the quality control and 
consequently some defective computers are sent forward in the production line. The graphic below shows this 
process. 
 











What reasoning did you apply to solve this problem? 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
How confident are you in the correctness of your response? 
Not at all confident Slightly confident A moderate amount confident Moderately confident Extremely confident 
1 2 3 4 5 
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